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Category: Police Early Warning System

Early Intervention Systems: The Impact of Establishing Best Practice Policies

Posted on by Nicholas Frankel

EIS PolicyLaw enforcement personnel have a unique position in our society. They are responsible for the safety and security of all those who reside in, work in, and visit their jurisdictions. As such, they have great responsibility to carry out their duties and exercise their authority within the bounds of established policies and procedures, which are an essential component of any law enforcement agency. Policies address pertinent matters, such as what entails acceptable behavior by employees. Procedures within a policy define a sequence of steps to be followed in a consistent manner — for example, the actions that need to be taken for an out-of-policy event.

As a general roadmap, policies ensure:

  • Strategic Alignment: Policies safeguard that law enforcement agencies’ actions are aligned with their mission, goals, and objectives.
  • Integrity: Clearly written policies help law enforcement personnel understand agency values and be more responsible for their actions.
  • Fairness and Consistency: Policies ensure all law enforcement personnel are treated impartially and in a reasonable manner.
  • Efficiency: Setting expectations and rules ahead of time saves time and any costs associated with inefficiencies.
  • Safety and Risk Management: Policies can prevent some problems from occurring or getting worse.

Policies and Procedures are Key to your EIS Success

Early Intervention Systems (EIS) are designed to identify officers who may be at risk of incidents, enabling targeted education and support to prevent potential issues. These systems are integral to modern policing strategies, focusing on officer wellness and performance improvement.

Having well-defined policies and procedures around an agency’s Early Intervention System has many important benefits, including:

  • Facilitating the prompt review of work-related occurrences involving their personnel that is non-disciplinary in nature.
  • Helping supervisory personnel make informed, fair, reasonable, and consistent decisions regarding the behavior and/or performance of their personnel.
  • Assisting agencies in exercising their responsibility to identify and support their personnel whose actions or inactions indicate possible stressors and/or need for intervention.

For agencies looking to enlist an Early Intervention System, establishing and maintaining specific EIS policies will improve the likelihood of getting off-track officers back on track; aid supervisors in their planning and support of officers; and build trust that the EIS at its core is a support tool. In the end, it will impact the overall integrity and success of your EIS.

Exploring EIS Policy Best Practices

In Benchmark’s recent installment of our Data Dialogue webinar series, Chief Partnerships Officer Chris Casula led a best-practice discussion on EIS polices. Titled “Early Intervention Systems: Exploring Best Practices for Establishing Your Agency’s Policies”, the webinar included an esteemed panel of agency leaders who have implemented – or currently are implementing – and EIS for their agencies, including Major Mike Harris and Captain Stephen Flatt at Charlotte-Mecklenburg PD; Sergeant Darwin Naval from San Francisco PD; and Senior Corporal Jared Nielsen with Dallas PD.

Each panelist highlighted their department’s unique approach to early intervention, discussing key issues surrounding policy, including:

  • Establishing an overall process for prompt review of flagged officers
  • Determining key stakeholders
  • Categorizing levels of at-risk behaviors
  • Developing non-punitive interventions
  • And developing training and mentoring resources

Policy in Action — Responding to Alerts

The discussion commenced with a summary of the four prevalent policy and procedural strategies agencies employ when responding to EIS alerts — with panelists weighing in on which one their agency uses and why. The four approaches – which were discussed in-depth in a previous session – include:

  1. Centralized: A chosen group of department leaders addresses each alert. Although efficient, this method can seem detached in larger agencies.
  2. Centralized Review: Here, a dedicated risk management team supervises all alerts. While this approach leverages specialized knowledge, it can inadvertently create a divide between the unit and the broader group of officers, possibly engendering an “us vs. them” attitude.
  3. Decentralized: Here, front-line supervisors are responsible for responding to their officers’ alerts. While fostering close bonds, this might result in inconsistencies due to diverse supervisory styles.
  4. Capacity Building: This is a combined effort where the risk management team collaborates with supervisors to provide training and expertise in deciphering alerts. It promises consistency and local responsibility, connecting various stakeholders and fostering trust.

Charlotte Mecklenburg PD’s decentralized model empowers the immediate chain of command to address alerts, believing supervisors are best positioned to understand and support their officers. According to Major Mike Harris, Charlotte Mecklenburg PD: “Ours is decentralized, pushing everything to the chain of command because with 1800 officers a centralized EIS couldn’t get to the granular issues like direct supervisors can. It’s meant as an intervention and employee wellness program.”

In contrast, San Francisco PD adopts a hybrid model, combining centralized review with decentralized action, depending on the alert’s severity. Senior Corporal Jared Nielsen, Dallas PD: “The officer’s chain of command reviews the alert and meets with them to create an action plan if needed. The goal is helping officers perform better.” Dallas PD is overhauling its program to transition from a threshold-based model, focusing on supporting officers through various non-punitive measures.

Across the board, panelists emphasized the importance of differentiating EIS from disciplinary measures. The systems are designed to support officers through voluntary training or incremental guidance and assistance, depending on the situation’s specifics. The goal is to help officers perform better and achieve more favorable career outcomes.

Building Trust through Policy Communication

A recurring theme was the need to build trust and ensure communication about the intent of an EIS — before, during and after the implementation process. Educating officers about the non-punitive nature of these systems is crucial. Many officers are unaware of the EIS in their departments, so informing them about its supportive purpose is key. This approach involves offering various options, like training or counseling, to assist officers effectively.

Sergeant Darwin Naval, San Francisco PD: “The biggest obstacle is communicating to officers that the system is non-punitive and supportive. Many don’t know we have an EIS. Educating all levels of the department has been crucial.”

According to Major Harris, “I think the most important thing I’ve learned in developing this program with Benchmark and First Sign is first clearly defining your ultimate goal for your EIS. For us, although the public likes terms like ‘early intervention,’ the backdrop is officer wellness.”

The panelists agreed it’s important that agencies clearly communicate an EIS as a supportive employee wellness initiative rather than a punitive tool. Conveying positive intent behind intervention policies and procedures proves vital for trust, participation, and outcomes. A cohesive internal team for continuity and momentum is recommended for achieving an agency’s communication goals.

EIS Customization and Flexibility is Key

The panelists agreed on the importance of customization and flexibility with an EIS. The systems should be tailored to individual departments and officers’ needs. Rigidity in such programs can be counterproductive. Continuous collaboration between law enforcement agencies and their EIS partner is vital to ensure the systems meet specific requirements and effectively support officers. According to Captain Flatt, “We held classes on the policy and system for all supervisors, stressing its supportive, non-punitive purpose as an early warning tool to make officers better. The flexibility to customize officer action plans has brought surprisingly good ideas from sergeants and lieutenants.”

Customization to each department’s policies, data sources, and localized needs makes platforms markedly more effective than inflexible one-size-fits-all systems. Frequent in-person communication from leadership around the progress and impact of their EIS can also be invaluable.

Addressing Performance and Wellness with Confidence

This final webinar of the year underscored the importance of Early Intervention Systems as a personnel management tool — and how having thoughtful EIS policies and procedures in place will enhance and impact results for your agency. The insights shared by the panelists provide valuable guidance for agencies looking to implement a new EIS.

Enlisting an advanced, data-driven solution like First Sign Early Intervention is crucial for adopting a proactive approach to officer wellness and performance. It goes beyond standard systems by establishing benchmarks that more accurately identify levels of behavior in need of support.

Adopting an Early Intervention System: A Blueprint for Success

Posted on by Nicholas Frankel

EIS Blueprint for Success

An Early Intervention System (EIS) can be a crucial asset for law enforcement agencies interested in managing their risk, in part by identifying officers who need assistance or support. The right system should monitor officer behavior and performance data to identify potential issues early, enabling focused interventions to minimize misconduct. However, the successful adoption of an EIS involves nuanced considerations in change management, data utilization, stakeholder engagement, implementation, and outcome measurement. This blueprint outlines essential factors in each area and serves as a roadmap for those agencies considering an EIS for optimizing officer performance.

Managing Change with Data

Introducing an EIS to an agency constitutes a significant cultural and technological shift that requires meticulous planning. According to an IACP policy document published in May 2020, agencies should consider several essential factors before moving forward with an EIS, such as:

  • The time commitment to administer the program
  • Deciding which agency-specific data points are critical for tracking and identifying performance trends
  • Establishing how that data will be collected, tracked, and used
  • Establishing policy for mapping potential actionable next steps once that data is extrapolated
  • Having alignment on who will be managing the execution and oversight of those next steps

Change management within any organization is never a light undertaking; it requires a strong commitment to achieve the objective at hand. For law enforcement agencies adopting an EIS it can mean the difference between helping struggling officers get back on track to become more productive in a non-punitive way — versus missing the opportunity to give them the incremental attention they need.

Using Data Effectively

The effectiveness of an EIS hinges on the quality of its data. Best practices for data application are:

  • Indicator selection: Prioritize in-depth data points that correlate closely with risk, such as arrest history, use of force incidents, internal affairs complaints, and missed court appearances. As stated in PERF’s 2015 article, Managing the Risks of Officer Misconduct and Failure through Early Intervention Systems: “Careful selection of data indicators based on those most predictive of risk is crucial for an EIS to flag situations accurately.”
  • Context analysis: Understanding the situations surrounding data points is critical for distinguishing meaningful trends — driven by complex, nuanced factors, such as adverse incidents, sequence of events, patterns of behavior and peer comparisons.
  • Ongoing indicator updates: Regular evaluations can guide adjustments for iterative learning, so that your EIS gets smarter and more efficient over time.
  • Data system integration: an EIS should be built on a modern suite of software with structured and accessible data — so that it’s easily integrated with incident data-capture systems, including computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems and record management systems (RMS) — as well as any existing personnel management systems in place, for a holistic ‘data in’ view that connects disparate information.

Measuring Outcomes

Quantifiable metrics are vital for realizing the impact of an EIS. Best-practice performance indicators include:

  • A predictive model that identifies patterns of problematic behavior and patterns of exceptional conduct
  • Understanding context of activity to distinguish between Quality and Quantity of activity to eliminate excessive flags and investigations
  • Account for detailed officer activity relative to immediate peer groups to determine risk levels
  • Provide explainable, actionable alerts with non-punitive, non-disciplinary interventions
  • Transform risk management by significantly reducing exposure to rising liability costs

By consistently tracking such metrics, police departments can validate the advantages of an EIS for officers, departments as a whole, as well as the communities they serve.

Grounded in Research

It is critical that any data analysis is informed by research focused on utilizing performance data of officers so that the EIS can identify officers needing incremental support. First Sign® Early Intervention is the only EIS that uses national research combined with the patterns of data generated within an individual agency over several years to identify those law enforcement personnel with the greatest need for intervention.

Data scientists, who are experts in the field, developed First Sign based on a holistic view of available information that is indicative of risk. Drawing from multiple indicator categories, the First Sign system calculates overall activity and behavior, as well as trends compared to peer groups based on rank, nature of assignment, geography, and deployment time.

Because of this expertise, First Sign is a proven, predictive, and preventative system unlike any other to identify officers at risk for problematic behavior:

  • First Sign has seen an average model precision of 85%. For comparison, traditional early warning systems have a model precision of roughly 30%.
  • With a great degree of confidence, First Sign can identify an average of 5% of officers at risk within an agency.
  • Additionally, that 5% is responsible for 66% of injuries (both officer and citizens) and disproportionate use of force incidents.

Assessing Levels of Risk and Courses of Action

The effectiveness of any EIS largely depends on a department’s ability to manage a systematic set of actions to assist officers displaying at-risk behaviors. Upon identifying such behavior, it is advisable for agencies to have a process for assessing the officer’s level of risk. Subsequently, a specific, monitored plan that is non-punitive and non-disciplinary should be developed and implemented to provide the officer with the necessary support.

To facilitate this crucial phase, Benchmark offers a platform known as C.A.R.E. (Case Action Response Engine®). This course-of-action platform aids law enforcement agencies in managing officers identified as at-risk with First Sign, by featuring research-based case management modules. These modules are tailored for officer-specific interventions and include benchmarks for best practices at various levels of intervention. The goal of C.A.R.E. is to assist departments in ensuring that no officers displaying at-risk behavior go unattended.

A Skilled Implementation Team is Key

Getting to go-live in order to harness the full power of an EIS requires a seasoned implementation team — preferably one comprised of people who have either served in government roles or have substantial work experience serving complex municipal and government customers specifically. Certainly, all team members should have deep experience deploying configurable off-the-shelf software to customers.

Ideally, you should anticipate ongoing investment and research that constantly increases functionality, provides guidance on best practices, and allows access to research on personnel development.

Finally, the team should consist of a strategic mix of implementers, data scientists, and engineers to ensure an effective and efficient implementation.

The Path Forward: Navigating the Road to Early Intervention Success

Adopting an effective early intervention system requires a collective dedication to change, while the rewards to agencies can be substantial — from improved officer performance to enhanced community relations.

If your department is considering implementing an EIS — or you believe you can do better than your current system, contact Benchmark Analytics to speak with a solutions expert about First Sign® Early Intervention System. As the only data-driven, research-based EIS available today, First Sign empowers law enforcement agencies to harness their data for exceptional personnel management.

 

Early Alerts, Timely Action: The Impact of a Research-Based EIS

Posted on by Nicholas Frankel

In an ever-evolving society, the roles and expectations placed on law enforcement officers – including how they engage and interact with the communities they serve – are continually changing. The same is true for how they are managed and supported for optimal on-the-job performance. As part of that infrastructure, the right early intervention system can become an indispensable tool for agency leaders aiming to discern and act on any potentially problematic patterns in officer behavior.

Such a system would be designed to identify and address these patterns before they develop into major incidents, ensuring the public’s safety and the officer’s well-being. Yet, the thoughtful implementation of a successful EIS requires careful consideration, adept change management, and a comprehensive understanding of an agency’s culture.

This summer, Benchmark Analytics presented the second installation of their Data Dialogue webinar series, led by CEO Ron Huberman, titled “Navigating EIS Alerts: Mastering the Right Approach for Your Agency.” Among the panel of participants were Benchmark’s Chief Research Officer, Nick Montgomery, Vice President of Data Science, Dr. Ugochi Jones, and Director of Data and Enterprise Analytics, Riley Maloney.

Four Approaches to EIS Alerts

Riley Maloney kicked off the discussion by outlining the four prevalent strategies that agencies employ in response to EIS alerts, signaling that an officer might need intervention. These strategies included:

  1. Centralized: A chosen group of department leaders addresses each alert. Although efficient, this method can seem detached in larger agencies.
  2. Centralized Review: Here, a dedicated risk management team supervises all alerts. While this approach leverages specialized knowledge, it can inadvertently create a divide between the unit and the broader group of officers, possibly engendering an “us vs. them” attitude.
  3. Decentralized: Here, front-line supervisors are responsible for responding to their officers’ alerts. While fostering close bonds, this might result in inconsistencies due to diverse supervisory styles.
  4. Capacity Building: This is a combined effort where the risk management team collaborates with supervisors to provide training and expertise in deciphering alerts. It promises consistency and local responsibility, connecting various stakeholders and fostering trust.

Riley observed that the efficacy of each model is contingent on the agency’s internal intervention mechanisms. More and more agencies are turning to Benchmark – with its First Sign® Early Intervention and C.A.R.E. platforms – and as a result, these agencies can discern the most fitting approach for their organizational design.

“In each of these systems, it’s vital to remember that an early intervention system’s strength lies in the interventions allocated in response to an alert. If an alert arises but is not acted upon, it’s futile. Benchmark dedicates significant time collaborating with agencies during the rollout phase to identify which of the four methods, or perhaps a new one, is most suited for their specific context. The aim is to determine how an agency can respond most effectively to an EIS alert.”

The Importance of Documentation

Often, in decentralized models, sergeants – due to their close ties with officers – are the first responders to EIS alerts. Yet, some supervisors might hesitate in documenting interventions, choosing instead to address matters informally. Despite good intentions, more documentation is needed to ascertain the efficacy of these interventions.

The panel acknowledged the importance of maintaining productive relationships with officers. However, they also emphasized that thorough documentation is indispensable for gauging success.

Challenges and Solutions in EIS Implementation

The discussion evolved toward potential obstacles in implementing an early intervention system. For instance, in larger agencies, supervising officers may become disconnected from frontline officers, complicating meaningful interventions. Additionally, some supervisors might need more training to formally document interventions due to existing cultural norms within the agency or lack of training.

Benchmark’s Chief Research Officer Nick Montgomery championed the capacity-building model, underscoring its balance between immediate alert responses and aiding supervisors in interpreting data and devising meaningful interventions.

“In any department, promotions are inevitable. Officers ascend to the rank of sergeants, and sergeants get promoted to lieutenants, among other shifts. There will be departures and new inductions, signifying change. This capacity-building method isn’t just about managing this flux. It’s centered on empowering individuals with the requisite skills to flourish in this dynamic setting. This isn’t confined to logistical details but extends to enhancing communication with officers, interpreting data accurately, and formulating robust strategies. Ultimately, it prepares the department for sustained improvement.”

Dr. Ugochi Jones delved into the shortcomings of casual interventions and emphasized the need for careful documentation. “In my discussions with supervisors, many who aren’t deeply engaged with the system (First Sign) still favor informal intervention. While they value effective communication when addressing potential issues among officers, they feel documentation makes it overly formal. We must consider this sentiment in our approach.”

Dr. Jones stressed the importance of constructive, data-driven exchanges with officers and the imperative to shift the perception and reality of interventions as a punitive measure to a supportive tool for officers. Meanwhile, Riley Maloney advocated for the inclusion of diverse stakeholders when shaping EIS policies, positing that this broad-based approach bolsters system trust.

The Path Forward

Effective communication and supervisory advancements are crucial. Benchmark’s First Sign is the only peer-to-peer, research-backed early intervention system — and has the potential to become a force multiplier for positive organizational transformation, with its implementation varying from agency to agency. The consensus among the panel was clear: for agencies with over a hundred officers, the capacity-building approach appears to be the most fitting. Meanwhile, smaller agencies benefit from a centralized or centralized review approach. However, the panel emphasized that agencies should not choose an approach based solely on size.

No single method can achieve widespread organizational change. Successful implementation requires a comprehensive strategy, strong stakeholder engagement, and the careful integration of technology.

 

Officer Management in the Digital Age: The Impact of Predictive Early Intervention Systems

Posted on by Nicholas Frankel

predictive early intervention systems

An early intervention system (EIS) can be an instrumental tool for law enforcement agencies looking to track and address problematic patterns in officer behavior. The ideal EIS should be proactive in nature by enabling leadership to identify off-track behavior before it becomes a real problem — and should work seamlessly within the agency’s unique organizational needs and culture. Conversely, an EIS should also be able to identify positive patterns of behavior in officers exhibiting exemplary performance.

This spring, Benchmark Analytics conducted a webinar delving deep into this subject as part of our ongoing Data Dialogue series. Panelists included Ron Huberman, CEO of Benchmark Analytics and Nick Montgomery, Chief Research Officer at Benchmark. The dialogue centered around four principal areas concerning EIS: its evolution, data significance, its departmental adaptation, and perceptions towards its daily use by agencies and officers.

Evolution of Early Intervention Systems

Huberman, who rose through the ranks of the Chicago Police Department to serve as Assistant Deputy Superintendent, shed light on the progression of EIS within police departments — tracing its origins from the 1970s up to the recent advancements of today. Initially, departments utilized rudimentary “trigger-based” systems. However, these systems often produced “false positives” and “false negatives.”

As Huberman explained, “The University of Chicago published a lot of compelling research that showed trigger-based systems typically had a 70% false positive problem, which means 70% of the time it was flagging officers that were doing their job as they should. Furthermore, they had about a 40% false negative problem, meaning they were actually missing officers who were really struggling out there.”

While policing continued to evolve around more data-centric solutions, early intervention systems failed to keep up — until the introduction of First Sign® by Benchmark. First Sign offers a research-driven early intervention system that utilizes various data sources, including arrest records and use-of-force reports, with machine learning to identify predictive patterns. The digital transformation of departmental records and advanced algorithms provide a level of accuracy that trigger-based systems lacked at the time and still do to this day.

The Power of Integrated Datasets

Benchmark’s Chief Research Officer Nick Montgomery emphasized the power of converging various departmental datasets. An amalgamation of data, including over twenty event markers, can lead to over ninety predictive variables for each officer. This holistic approach greatly enhances the understanding of officer behavior compared to analyzing singular incidents. As he so powerfully stated, “…a research-based early warning system takes all of the data inside a police department looking back over five, ten, fifteen years and uses those various patterns of behavior to create a system that is far more predictive and can accurately identify officers likely to have an adverse event based on past events.”

Proactive Prevention of Harm

Early intervention systems can offer valuable insights by identifying officers exhibiting at-risk behavior, allowing for prompt intervention through training or counseling before problems escalate. Research conducted with the University of Chicago demonstrates that traditional EIS platforms using threshold-based triggers have a 70% fallacy rate for flagging at-risk officers. In contrast, First Sign boasts an 85% efficacy rate. Furthermore, our findings suggest that no more than 5% of officers contribute to over 60% of excessive force incidents.

Addressing the challenges with this specific group can significantly enhance community trust. Constructive, non-punitive supervision remains crucial for the efficacy of early intervention systems. In Huberman’s words, a modern research-based system like First Sign enables supervisors to say, “‘Hey, Officer Smith – I know you’re a good guy – and a good officer – but you were flagged in the system, so it’s important I intervene. Let’s talk about next steps to correct your at-risk behavior and how you’re engaging the public.'”

Signs of Impact

Preliminary data suggests that the implementation of an EIS can yield tangible results. Huberman shared data indicating a 50% reduction in the severity of force used by flagged officers post-supervisory intervention. Complaint rates against these officers also saw a significant decrease. Importantly, essential enforcement activities remain largely unaffected. And how do we know this? Benchmark has the world’s largest database on officer performance — and we’ve validated all predictive analytics through a standardized national model developed in partnership with the University of Chicago.

Embracing Modernization: The Future of Policing

In today’s rapidly evolving world, modernization touches every corner of our lives, from how we communicate to how we conduct business. Similarly, the realm of law enforcement isn’t exempt from this wave of change. The adoption of research-based methodologies combined with technological innovation reflects the evolution of policing in line with modern trends.

Historically, police reform efforts have been broad and overarching, often applying wide-reaching solutions like general de-escalation training for entire forces. But as we’ve seen, these blanket approaches might not always address the nuances and individual needs of officers. In many cases, the emphasis is shifting to more tailored tactics and tools, most likely powered by data science and analytics.

By harnessing the capabilities of modern data science, First Sign Early Intervention allows for a more focused course of action, directly targeting officers who genuinely need support. As a result, law enforcement stands at a pivotal moment where trust can be fostered within the communities they serve, internal personnel practices improved, and genuine change affected.

As Ron Huberman eloquently summarized, “There’s a tremendous opportunity before all of us in this profession – who view it as a noble calling and care deeply about policing – to say, ‘Let’s make a difference. Let’s turn this corner now because we have the tools to do so.’ I truly believe this is the moment we’re at.”

Municipalities, Insurance, and Law Enforcement Risk Management

Posted on by Nicholas Frankel

A new era of police reform has brought with it increased public attention to the liability costs of law enforcement, specifically in cases of misconduct settlements and risk management policy. Though the overall number of claims brought against law enforcement agencies has been relatively flat in the previous decade, the cost of misconduct settlements has increased dramatically. As a part of the broad continuum of reform efforts currently underway throughout the country, departments and municipalities are taking a close look at their risk management strategies to control liability costs.

Risk Management Basics

Risk management in law enforcement entered a new stage with the Supreme Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape (1961). This decision, stemming from a high-profile misconduct claim, allowed individuals to sue law enforcement officers for damages in cases related to the deprivation of constitutional rights. The ruling opened a new area of risk for departments and municipalities, making it necessary for them to address legal costs and potential settlements arising from misconduct-related litigation.

Risk ManagementCommercial insurance companies were the first to offer policies specifically designed to help municipalities and law enforcement agencies mitigate their exposure to the financial risk of litigation. These policies worked on the basic principles of commercial insurance: grouping and limiting risk factors. Insurance market disruptions of the late 1970s and early 1980s led some municipalities and agencies to turn to risk pools and self-insurance. Now the vast majority of agencies and municipalities use at least one of these strategies.

“These insurers influence law enforcement agencies in various ways. They shape the content of departmental policies on things like high-speed pursuits and the use of force. They have a hand in how officers are trained, and how much training they receive.” John Rappaport, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Research Matters Blog

There is no one “right” strategy for a municipality. The complexity of local and state laws and the unique circumstances confronting leaders in different cities and departments make it difficult to make overly broad characterizations about any one strategy, let alone assess its efficacy in a general way. Though all of these insurance strategies have the same goal – managing risk in law enforcement – they take decidedly different approaches. Here are some of the critical points in each risk management strategy:

Municipal Risk Pools

In the law enforcement arena, risk pools are the most common kind of risk protection employed by municipalities, with a significant number of small- to medium-sized cities participating in these organizations. They came into prominence in the early 1980s to mitigate the cost fluctuations that many municipalities were experiencing due to disruptions in the commercial insurance market. Practically, they serve a similar function to commercial insurance companies. Cities, counties, or other government entities group together to pool their risk to diversify it and to control costs.

Risk pools are specialized “non-profit, mission-driven” entities that, optimally, mean cost savings for municipalities compared to the fees and need for profit in commercial insurance. They often employ retired police officers and administrators as consultants to help guide member municipalities’ risk management policies. Additionally, many risk pools engage with third-party data analysis providers to understand risk from a research-based perspective. While the recommendations provided by in-house staff and third-party firms aren’t always binding, this fluency in the language of law enforcement, coupled with an understanding of the nature of the profession in general offered by risk pool officials, helps engender a spirit of buy-in from member agencies.

Commercial Insurance

Today, commercial insurance is most often utilized by midsized cities with populations around 100,000 residents. This insurance works much like other types of commercial insurance, with insurance providers assessing risk, charging a premium, and providing coverage based on the terms of the agreement. In terms of overall costs, they can be seen as more stable than alternative forms of municipal insurance, though sometimes more costly. Commercial insurance companies typically offer many different types of insurance, leading to a much more diverse portfolio of risk than other means of municipal insurance. After insurance pricing and supply fluctuations of the late-1970s and early-1980s disrupted coverage for some municipalities, the industry is now well-regulated and better-capitalized, offering another layer of financial stability to cities.

Insurance companies use loss prevention analysts to study an agency’s policies to understand better what’s working or where they can offer specific procedures or policy suggestions. The companies also utilize underwriting and price setting to incentivize adopting policies they believe will reduce risk. The relationship between insurers and municipalities is a business relationship — meaning that while these recommendations and pricing structures do create an incentive, they typically are not binding.

Self-Insurance

Self-insurance as a practice is most frequently, though not exclusively, seen in larger cities with extensive tax bases and substantial budgets. It rarely means “going without” an insurance structure but instead carefully assessing risk and planning a budget to cover litigation costs. This type of risk management gives municipalities the greatest autonomy in setting policy and, potentially, if not managed effectively, more risk exposure.

Risk management practices are generally at the municipality’s discretion. Consent decrees and state mandates can also play a significant role in setting policies related to risk management. The robust budgets of many larger cities can help them absorb the costs of litigation and more easily put practical new risk management tools into places like body-worn cameras, smart car technology, or early intervention systems.

Risk Solutions

In response to an urgent need for more effective risk management strategies in law enforcement, Benchmark Analytics is launching Benchmark Risk Solutions™ a first-of-its-kind product suite using evidence-based risk analytics, advanced predictive modeling, and proven loss-control interventions to mitigate law enforcement liability. By proactively assessing risk, the product suite identifies loss-prevention actions and proven interventions to manage these underlying risk drivers while continually measuring its effectiveness.  This suite of products is designed to meet the needs of every insurance strategy, enabling public risk pool professionals, municipal risk managers, law enforcement command staff to better control costs and achieve greater financial stability. See our press release for more information.

Look for future posts where we will be exploring other aspects of law enforcement and municipal risk management.

 

 

Reference

Rappaport, John. “How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police.” Harvard Law Review. 130.6 (2017). 1541-1613. Web. 25 September 2021.

A Year of Change: A Look at State-Driven Police Reform Efforts

Posted on by Nicholas Frankel

It would be an understatement to say that in the last 12 months the world has changed in ways no one could have predicted. A global pandemic disrupted social norms, healthcare infrastructure and economic stability. Add to that a series of high-profile law enforcement incidents that ultimately resulted in renewed calls for police reform — and it’s easy to see how historians will look back at this year as a pivotal moment for change in the face of challenge and adversity.

One of the outcomes was an unusually active legislative environment, with states from coast to coast focused on enhanced as well as new police reform legislation. During this tenure of rapid change that continues today, it’s important to step back and look at the big picture in state-level policing reforms — to more thoroughly understand them in a broader context. According to a recent analysis by The Washington Post more than 2,000 policing-related bills have been introduced across the country since June of 2020. By unpacking and understanding the broad aims of these bills, departments and their leaders can better anticipate potential reform efforts that affect them and implement more effective change management strategies in response.

state-driven police reformTypically, most states have a pre-determined legislative period, with some not even meeting on an annual basis. In the last 12 months, 23 of them held special legislative sessions outside of their normal legislative periods. While many of these sessions were called to tackle the impacts of the pandemic and provide special funding for first responders, it also gave lawmakers the opportunity to address urgent calls for police reform specific to use of force as well as accountability and transparency.

Newly compiled numbers from the National Conference of State Legislatures show that almost half of the states enacted some form of legislation that changed the way police operate. These reform efforts covered everything from physical interactions during arrests to record-keeping and compliance. In addition to these 24, several more states passed oversight reforms, calling for commissions or other groups to study ways to improve standards and transparency.

Two of the most common types of reform have been those addressing the use of neck-restraints, or chokeholds, and those mandating an officer’s duty to report or intervene. 18 states and the District of Columbia passed laws limiting the use of neck restraints with ten states banning them outright. Other legislation passed in 12 states requires officers to report and, in many cases, attempt to intervene to prevent out-of-policy instances of force by a fellow officer. Further, some states have enacted broader, more comprehensive reform measures — for example:

  • Colorado Governor Polis signed into law a broad accountability bill titled Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity, where agencies will be required – among other things – to report all details of all use of force incidents that result in death or serious bodily injury; track all instances when a peace officer resigned under investigation for violation of policy; and maintain a database on officer de-certifications
  • Governor Sununu of New Hampshire signed an executive order establishing the state’s Commission on Law Enforcement Accountability, Community, and Transparency. Benchmark Analytics was selected to develop and implement a state capture of employment, training, and disciplinary history as well as certification across 200+ statewide law enforcement agencies.
  • Washington state Governor Inslee recently signed a dozen police accountability bills into law, notably including the creation of a statewide database of police use of force incidents, through the Washington State Office of the Attorney General.
  • New York, where Governor Cuomo issued an executive order that every law enforcement agency in the state adopt a reform plan by April 1, 2021. Titled New York State Police Reform and Reinvention Collaborative, the order requires that agencies develop clear policies specific to Use of Force and Early Intervention.
  • In Virginia, Governor Northam signed sweeping legislation comprised of a dozen bills covering everything from use of force and tactics to crisis intervention protocol, all areas requiring additional training and certification for officers.
  • The state of Utah passed several law enforcement bills signed into law by Governor Cox, including requiring Utah agencies to meet the FBI’s standards for reporting use of force — as well as setting up a panel to consider and make recommendations on data collection.
  • After the passage and signing of the Minnesota Police Accountability Act of 2020, Benchmark Analytics partnered with Minnesota POST to implement a statewide portal to capture internal affairs misconduct complaints across 400+ of the state’s law enforcement agencies.

Additionally, some states are mandating the reporting of incident data to both state and federal agencies. These reporting requirements as part of oversight trends are generally aimed at increasing the dataset available to the communities that agencies serve — as well as policymakers, researchers and data scientists. One of the thoughts behind these new requirements is that, with a larger dataset to study, it will better enable evidence-based decision-making at multiple levels of government and law enforcement.

Most observers see these legislative actions as the beginning, rather than conclusion of a process towards meaningful change in the way law enforcement agencies track and manage their forces. Comprehensive personnel management systems can make a substantial difference in the ease of which this data is monitored internally and reported out to various agencies and oversight bodies.

The Benchmark Management System (BMS), for example, features reporting tools designed to simplify data retrieval and review, putting incident-based data for individual officers, comparative stats for units, and a host of other data analysis features in one, simple-to-implement tool. This not only allows leaders to ensure accurate and timely milestone reporting to satisfy the requirements of any new legislation mandates, but day in and day out it empowers them to monitor performance data in real time, giving them an up-to-the-minute picture of the officers under their command. BMS also includes a next-generation Training Management System to help agencies track and manage any additional requirements and certifications as a result of new reform standards.

Law enforcement agencies are experiencing a time of rapid change in the way they do their work. New legislation will undoubtedly continue to shape not only law enforcement practices, but also training and the way data is managed and reported. By having a deeper understanding of not just the mandates of new legislation but the trends they represent, law enforcement agencies and their leaders can better rise to the occasion, ensuring their officers are well-equipped to navigate these changes.

Our next article will be looking at the role that state POST organizations are expected to play in these latest reform efforts.

Our Work in Progress and Reflections on Policing in the Past

Posted on by Amy Vracar

The following is part 2 of 2 in our IACP Leadership Series conversation between Benchmark CEO Ron Huberman and Thomas Eicher, Executive Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability, New Jersey Office of the Attorney General. In this entry, Mr. Eicher discusses new polices his state is implementing to improve transparency and accountability, moving toward a more effective, evidence-based early intervention system — as well as sharing his thoughts on various policing reforms over time and the need to look at the criminal justice system as a whole.

RH: Tom, let’s continue our discussion on police reform policies being initiated or expanded upon in your state of New Jersey. Your novel concept of tracking and reviewing use-of-force incidents statewide by assigning a county prosecutor to work with every agency is breakthrough. What else are you implementing?

TE: Sure. The other thing we looked at was transparency, and we issued an updated body-worn camera policy that requires disclosure to the public within the completion of the initial investigation, typically 20 days for a police-involved shooting. We have expanded that to not only body-worn cameras, but dash cams and private cameras that might inform the public what really happened during a particular incident.

We issued an amended policy about impeachment material for officers. Even though it’s been the law for a long time, we had not had a statewide policy that really set out in any detail the requirements to track and make available to defense counsel and defendants impeachment material about the officers who were testifying. We put that in place. We, again, pushed that on the county prosecutors a bit to put them at the frontline to gather that information and
make it available.

We thought these two updates were important reforms to strengthen public trust and heighten transparency. We also continued and emphasized our resiliency program where we looked at trying to help officers who needed assistance because of a problem in their life – such as a drug or alcohol issue –making it easier for them to reach out and get help without incurring disciplinary action.

Finally, and this is a work in progress, we are looking at how we can improve the early warning system directive that we have, and move it more towards an early intervention system — improving the capacity, either on a statewide level or within the individual departments, and the ability to implement this updated system in a way that really facilitates training, as opposed to discipline; or interventions early rather than later so that you don’t have to wait until something really goes off the rails. And importantly, using data rather than hunches about what actually is effective — as well as what you should be measuring and looking at.

That’s true for all we’re talking about . . . I think that the focus on using the data that’s available is really key. It’s what makes this multi-dimensional reform effort somewhat different than some of the earlier reforms that didn’t have that ability to gather and analyze the data — and help use that data to inform policies.

RH: You know what’s interesting, Tom? It’s that is precisely what I’ve advocated for in terms of what I’ve seen. In the ’50s we had the professional model policing: 911 came to take everything over, and everyone’s in uniform and random patrol — and it’s really what is even today the bedrock of policing. Through the ’70s, we started to see problem-oriented policing, which was followed by community policing. Community policing was concurrently overlaid with predictive policing,  joined by Compstat policing in the ‘90s, leading us up to this point in time.

What’s different to me at this point in time – and that you’ve articulated as well – is the fact that for the first time in the history of law enforcement, we have data and research to actually say, “We no longer have to rely on the hunch and the goodwill of a street supervisor. We can systematize an understanding of a pattern and practice of problematic behavior in the early stages — before we have horrific incidents that really crush our profession every time they happen.”

Tom, let me just tap into your experience. You were a federal prosecutor for 30 years, with much work in civil rights crimes. Has there been a trend you can identify? Were there things that you were much more likely to prosecute 30 years ago and 20 years ago than today? And more to the point, if you will, what is the nature of problematic conduct in civil rights violations today versus 30 years ago — or is it really the same show?

TE: I think it’s pretty similar, honestly. But there has been a trend. The original cases I was involved with were more corruption cases. Police cases where drugs were stolen, money was stolen, drugs were planted, officers were on the take. Now, that was in Philadelphia; not to give them a bad name, but I was a prosecutor in the city at the time. We also saw that in New Jersey when I moved over here.

And then, whether it was because of focus or difference in conduct, the use of force over the last five to 10 years has become much more of a focal point. I think the public’s understanding of what is reasonable force for police to use has evolved. I think there was an era when the public’s attitude was, “Hey, if they committed a crime, they brought it on themselves and the police should do whatever they need to do to take care of this person.” They really didn’t care what happened to him. I think that’s changed.

I think even people who have committed crimes are being seen more as a person. And even though they deserve whatever punishment the system will result in. It shouldn’t be at the hands of the officers. I think the public’s definition of reasonable force, which is always at the bedrock of even the constitutional law, has changed. I think it’s evolved. I think the public is expecting and asking for more restraint when it can be safely done.

I think that’s a change. I think that’s different. One of the challenges in prosecuting civil rights cases – especially those for people incarcerated and I did a number of those – is that a lot of jurors at that point were like, “Hey, they must’ve done something or they wouldn’t have been in jail in the first place. And so therefore, they don’t have any rights.”

Of course, that’s not the law, but that’s a very difficult climate to bring those cases into. I think the public sentiment has changed, in part maybe, because so many people know someone who’s been incarcerated or know somebody else who knows somebody. It’s not the stigma it used to be. I think there is a more humanizing of people, and an expectation that police will deal with effectively, but fairly, with everyone they interact with.

RH: No, it’s interesting. What do you think has brought the public around? Do you have a sense of why there’s been such a shift in how it’s perceived?

TE: I think it’s an accumulation of the incidents that we’ve seen. And I think it’s the starkness of the George Floyd situation. It’s also a recognition that there is a general perception – and we can argue about whether it’s true or not – but there’s a general public consensus, I would say for the most part, that law enforcement does not always act equally with every citizen. That there is different enforcement based on race — or based on assumptions about people.

I think that the public, for the most part, is sympathetic to that. I believe that’s a big change. And I think it goes beyond the community that’s being most directly affected — and has now broadened to others who were not part of that community, but feel that changes have to be made to make sure it’s not happening. So, I think that’s a big difference. I also believe that police are open — they want to do a good job. My experience has been that police don’t want to be the bad guys.

There are some bad apples, of course, but most police want to do a job effectively, want to do it fairly, and want to see themselves in that light . . .and I think they should. We have to give police the tools, the policies, and the training to do it. I think we didn’t do that.

To just anticipate a little bit of your question or what you mentioned about community policing, I think the Compstat model overran community policing. By focusing on data to see where crime hotspots were, and then deploying resources in that way, what it did is it tended to be almost a self-fulfilling prophecy. Less affluent neighborhoods, which in the major cities tended to be more minority, got much more attention from the police. So, then there were more arrests . . . and those arrests lead to more arrests. I think while it suppressed crime, it also created a really negative interaction with the community that I think has to be undone — through the community policing aspects of where you’re interacting, not just in a bad context, but in a normal everyday context.

The data that led the Compstat reform was effective in a way, but it undermined that community relationship in a way as well. I’ll give you an example: I won’t say the name of the case, but it involved the investigation of a fatal police encounter. The citizens that I spoke with about it said, “the police are always here harassing us. They’re in our neighborhood and they’re just always trying to catch us on some little things so they can stop us, try to search us, and see if they can find something.” I said, “All right. I understand that perspective.”

I talked to the police officer and I said, “What were you doing?” “We were on directed patrol”, he replied. “What does that mean?”, I asked. “We were in a neighborhood, a high crime neighborhood trying to catch them doing something like running a stop sign, so we could stop them and try to catch them with something”, he responded. They were both talking about exactly the same thing. The police thought it was highly effective law enforcement, and the neighborhood thought it was a means of oppression and being picked on.

It was interesting to see that the very same description of it almost leading to very different conclusions. I think both of them have some merit, but I believe if you’re only focusing in on one, and not the other, you’re going to lose the big picture. I think that’s what happened with Compstat.

RH: What’s so interesting, in my personal experience when I was a Chicago police officer, CAPS – which was the big Chicago police community initiative in the mid-’90s – was a major focus concurrent with Chicago’s version of Compstat. These initiatives were living concurrently — or trying to live concurrently. I think both had different success outcomes and both negated each other at some level.

What worries me a little bit about the current chapter of police reform, Tom, is the defund the police movement which I’m going to argue is not about funding per se, but just people being punitive by being in support of taking money away from the police. There’s an argument to be made that we should ask the question, “Who is the best person or group to deal with what situation?” I don’t think anyone’s going to pretend a police officer’s mental health training impacts a situation the way a mental health worker’s experience does. But to the degree that we peel the police away from humanizing interactions – giving that job away to other people – and leaving the police only to deal with crimes alone, we’re going to lose a certain humanity in all of this that could cause its own issues.

Tom, I’m going to close up with just a few questions. All of us who care a lot about the profession of policing and want to see it continually professionalized and elevated, we worry about democracy. Stick with me for a minute. There’s a whole body of political science that advises, “To the degree that people have faith in the systems of justice.” It’s not just the police . . . but police, courts, due process, etc. I believe when there’s a high level of public confidence, you see very stable democracies.

When you have a low level of faith in the systems of justice, you tend to see very weak democracies. If you look at South America, where there’s unbelievably low levels of confidence in systems of justice, you see democracies turn all the time. Very unstable governments. Well in the United States, much more so recently, folks’ faith in the systems of justice is deteriorating at a rapid pace. If you believe the work – you could say that’s a proxy to the health of our society, we should all be extremely worried about these reform efforts and building the trust.

Tom, what do you think we need to do to restore faith in policing, make it the honorable profession that it should be, and in many cases is, to the average American?

TE: I think that’s a really interesting question and it’s not one that a lot of people are focusing on right now. Part of it is, we require the police to do everything. We release people from the large mental health institutions and put them on the street — and the police are the first respondents, so that’s one.

Second, police also are saddled in some ways with the overall criminal justice system. Here’s what I mean by that; maybe I shouldn’t say this, but in one of the police departments that I’m involved in looking at, what we found was that African Americans had much more higher rates of arrest than Caucasians — and that’s obviously troubling. When we dug down a little more, what we found was, a lot of that difference can be explained by bench warrants out for individuals. They’re pulled over for speeding and they have a bench warrant. Well, if they have a bench warrant, the officer is going to arrest that person. They can’t ignore that warrant; It’s there, they’ve got to enforce it. What I mean is police are doing their job, but that can result in a lot of negative feelings by the community.

What do we have to do? We have to step back as we’re policing and not just focus on policing, but look at the criminal justice system at large. Is it really appropriate to have so many bench warrants for basically economic failures? You didn’t pay a fine, you didn’t pay the restoration fee on your driver’s license, you committed a crime, and now we’re going to tack financial penalties on top of it. So, a lot of that, as we saw on Ferguson [Missouri], is underlying a lot of the discontent with the police. The police are the face of that system that’s really, at some level, arguably oppressive to the people.

Not that they didn’t incur the fine, not they didn’t double-park or over run their meter — but the cumulative effect of it is, it creates this enormous negative energy between the people and the government. I think we have to step back. There have been those efforts by the Chief Justice in New Jersey and others to look at, “Is this the right way to do it? Should we be arresting somebody for an old parking ticket from a couple of years ago? Are there better ways to resolve that?” So, I think that’s part of what we have to do, is we have to help the police by taking a look at the big picture, at the whole criminal justice system, to see if we can do it in a more efficient and better way — and a more humane way. I think we can.

We’ve seen that in some of the re-entry efforts around the country that – once somebody’s served their time – it’s in everyone’s interest to see them succeed and to knock down barriers to that success. That’s just good common sense, because if you don’t do it, you’re going to end up with another person cycling through the system. I really do think what we have to do is not limit our focus to the police, but broaden it to the criminal justice system as a whole. And that requires some really fundamental discussions about what direction we want to go.

RH: Yes, I know. I’m so glad you brought that up, because I agree. There’s a big picture piece here and the micro-focus on police ultimately will not solve this problem; it’s bigger than that. We’re grateful for your service to our country as a prosecutor within the State of New Jersey — and everything that you do to elevate policing.

This interview from October 2020 has been edited for clarity.

 

The Importance of Establishing Tone — and a Transformative Way to Approach Use of Force Statewide

Posted on by Amy Vracar

The following is part 1 of 2 in our IACP Leadership Series conversation between Benchmark CEO Ron Huberman and Thomas Eicher, Executive Director of the Office of Public Integrity and Accountability, New Jersey Office of the Attorney General. In this entry, Mr. Eicher shares his belief in the importance of police chiefs setting the appropriate tone, expectations and sense of professionalism with the officers in their department — including the novel concept of assigning a county prosecutor to work with every agency.

RH: Tom, we’ve been talking to other leaders in the field about a variety of topics related to police reform. Let me start by asking a really broad question: Do you feel, at this moment in police reform in American history, that this is different in terms of the historical reforms that have occurred in policing — is this a pivotal point in time, or is it just another chapter?

TE: I do think it’s pivotal, and I think it’s different because it’s more broad-based. The prior reforms that I’ve been involved with and seen have been in response to specific incidents, and they’ve been top-down. But this one is really from the bottom up. This is really broad-based, involving large segments of the country: young, old, black and white are all engaged — and all want to see a difference. In my discussions with police officers and chiefs, I think they get it. However, police can be defensive – and considering some of the things that are being said – I think police take issue with the criticism . . . and rightly so.

I believe everyone I’ve talked to understands that – right or wrong – police have to respond to the public sentiment, because without public support they’re not going to be able to do their jobs. I think it is a challenging time because I feel some of the rhetoric is really out there. But I think police have to understand that this is their opportunity to be part of that process because change is going to happen. One of the concerns that I have is that as well-meaning as it is, people from the outside who don’t have an in-depth understanding of law enforcement, or background in the field, can try to come up with simple solutions — but the issues are more complicated than that.

RH: I agree. And I certainly worry about some of the past reforms because at times, from my perspective, they have seemed to dehumanize the police. Meaning they have not taken into full account all the day-to-day “stuff” that enable police officers to engage in thoughtful ways. Tom, let’s say that you were to wake up tomorrow, you’re a police chief — and you were giving yourself advice from someone who’s accountable for public integrity in the state of New Jersey: what would be the top thing you would advise a police chief must get right?

TE: I think it’s really not one thing because everything interacts. One thing I would say is, the chief has to set the tone for the department. It’s not a policy, or a practice even, it’s really just that the tone of the department has to be set by the chief, along with the expectations. What I would also say is that police officers need to understand themselves as professionals. They’re there to serve the public — not get down in the fray with the people that are breaking a law, but rise above it.

Obviously, police have to use force at times, they have to use force to do their jobs, but chiefs should be expecting more of the officers under their command. How do you do that? I think you set the tone with it, you be clear about what your expectations are . . . you develop written policies that set forth those expectations, you provide the training to implement the policies, and then you hold people accountable. Not that you’re going to create a sacrificial lamb, but if you intercede early – before things go really off the rails – then you can avoid those really bad incidents.

I think setting the right tone, letting your officers know you appreciate them and you have their back . . . but you’re going to demand and expect a level of professional engagement. It’s little things; like in some of my work, I’ve noticed the officers who are quick to swear or confront a potentially dangerous person are also those who are slipping over the line at times. I think the right tone and approach is part of the professionalism. I believe it goes across the board that the message to the officers has to be — you don’t stoop down to the level of some of the persons who may have committed a crime, but you rise above it and you expect more of yourself. The appropriate tone from the top is really critical.

RH: I’m in total agreement when it comes to early intervention and getting in front of inappropriate behavior. Tom, let’s talk about your role a little and what you see as the role of the state. Certainly, from my perspective as an observer of police policy and reform, the state of New Jersey is in front – almost more than any other state that we’ve seen – as part of the attorney general’s excellence in policing initiative. Can you share the basic framework of that initiative, as well as the logic behind that framework? How did your team come up with it? I think it’s such a compelling story for the country in terms of what you’re doing in New Jersey.

TE: Sure. Not to make it too personal, but I was a federal prosecutor for over 30 years. One of the things I did as a federal prosecutor was investigate and prosecute civil rights violations, including those propagated by police. When the Attorney General asked me to come work with him, I said I would do it as long as I got to be involved in police reform. Because what I realized was trying to change the relationship between the police and the community through occasionally prosecuting a really bad apple, it’s not going to really create the kind of reform that I thought needed to happen.

I agreed to come and set up this unit and run it for the Attorney General — I didn’t have to convince him. He was completely on board and said, “Let’s look at the big picture and see what we need to do.” This was before George Floyd, since I got here in 2018 and worked through the end 2019, we put together a series of reforms. We were convinced – and I am as well today – that it’s not one thing. There’s no silver bullet. It’s a series of things.

What does that include? It includes a functioning Internal Affairs and IA disciplinary process. We issued some new guidance and got the county prosecutors involved. They’re typically called district attorneys in many jurisdictions — more involved in reviewing police departments and what the police departments are doing. It requires more collecting of data about various outcomes, so that the public and county prosecutors in our office can look at data collected and say, “Why is it that nobody’s ever held accountable for a civilian complaint? Why are none of your excessive force complaints ever found to be justified?”

That piece of it – improving the Internal Affairs process – is absolutely critical because you don’t want to wait until something really, really bad happens that requires you to look at a criminal prosecution. Therefore, we also looked at that as well. Every police shooting in New Jersey is investigated — and we have the luxury, unlike most states, that New Jersey’s Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer for the state and can issue directives and policies that apply to every law enforcement officer in the state. That’s a very robust power.

He’s also not elected . . .so that also gives him the freedom, as long as he has the support of the Governor, to institute policies without regard to the election blocks. We looked at that. It’s one of the things we did across the board: we investigate every fatal shooting and review every non-fatal police shooting in the state of New Jersey. Our office does that. It gives us an across-the-board look at what’s happening — it uncovers the circumstances under which things go off the rails and things go bad.

RH: What would you say are the pros and the cons of charging the county prosecutor with reviewing things such as a pattern of IA in a local jurisdiction? It’s certainly not a common model . . . where it’s outside of a specific incident. How are you finding that it’s working? Would you recommend other states consider it?

TE: Because of the COVID-19 crisis, although we issued the policy in December of 2019, it didn’t go into effect until August of this year. Then we had to train up all 21 county prosecutors in New Jersey, so it’s early in the implementation phase. So I can’t really tell you how well it’s working at this point — we have 550 individual police departments in New Jersey. For us, to try to monitor and audit on a large scale would be impossible. It’s even hard for the county prosecutors, some of whom have over 70 municipalities in their jurisdiction. We’ve asked them to at least take a look at it. The idea is if you know somebody’s looking over your shoulder, you’re going to be more likely to take it seriously for fear that you’re going to be called on the carpet.

One of the things we’re looking at doing in our new use of force policy is requiring that every chief sign off on an annual report to the prosecutor’s office about the use of force by their department and requiring them to analyze and sign off on every use of force at some level. By requiring that they focus on it, it hopefully will encourage that the chiefs realize this is important. There are a lot of important things, but this is very important. It’s got to be looked at.

I believe the IA process is challenging, in part, for some reasons that folks have noted recently in the news: that even if the chief imposes discipline, it’s then subject to arbitration as well as appeal to the courts. This process can undermine the certainty of the discipline. We need to find a balance that allows the chief to exercise reasonable discipline, subject to due process, but does so in a way that’s swifter and more predictable. Right now, I think that’s one of the gaps we have in our system.

RH: If I understand it right, you guys [New Jersey] are one of the only five states in the country who don’t have a decertification process today. Is that correct?

TE: That’s correct.

RH: Not saying it’s super effective, but that it is not a tool if someone hops around or if there are other problems. It’s not available as a tool today to try to get in front of some issues.

TE: That’s exactly right. We have a Police Training Commission that does the initial training of officers. One of the things that was part of the excellence in policing was to have them make a decision about whether they recommend a licensing. And earlier this summer, they did come out unanimously in favor of a licensing or certification regime that would involve decertification as well.

What that’s going to do is put a floor on the process, and allow a statewide look at setting minimum standards — not only to become a police officer. In the past, there has not been even psychological testing that was required before somebody could go to the police academy. With this change, minimum standards would be there, which is important.

It would also likely require continuing education and training, keeping up with use of force policies, along with other policies that the Attorney General issues.

It will create a mechanism to weed out the really bad apples. One of the things we did in the Internal Affairs reforms we put in place last December was to require every department that hires a police officer from another department to check the Internal Affairs records for that officer. Now, they’re not required to act on them. They could look at the records and say, “Gee, this person has five sustained uses of force, but I’m going to hire him anyway.” But that’s where the licensing comes in as a backstop if you see a pattern. Once it’s set up, it will enable a really robust licensing or certification regime.

RH: It sounds like we will all be watching how effective it is by having the county prosecutor play that new role, right? It could be a model for the nation. I’m sure we’ll learn the pros and cons to each piece of this reform, but sounds like you’re moving the ball forward.

Let me get a chance, Tom, to share some of those other reforms that you guys are doing at the state level?

TE: Sure. One of the things we’re doing is requiring that every use of force incident is reported in a statewide portal. Every time a police officer uses force in New Jersey, they’re required to fill out a detailed account through an online system. The report is then shared with the attorney general’s office, the chief of the officer’s department, and with the county prosecutor. We will have a system that’s tracking detailed information about all uses of force across the state.

We will learn when are they occurring…what are the circumstances under which they’re occurring? What’s the type of force used? Which force ends up resulting in injuries? What’s the resistance level that the force is being used against? These reports will provide a detailed picture that’s going to allow the chiefs to look at use of force among officers. Importantly, in larger departments, chiefs can look at trends that may not be apparent just from anecdotal review. It also allows the county prosecutors to look at those departments and say, “Why is it that these two similarly situated departments have wildly different amounts of force being used within their jurisdiction?”

All this tracking data will allow the county prosecutor to sit down with each chief and talk about what’s happening in their department: What are the reasons for use of force actions . . . there may be good reasons or there may not be. I think this process is really exciting — it’s going to lead to not only more effective reform, but by the same principle, if you know what you’re doing is going to be reported and reviewed, you’re going to be more careful about it. You’re going to be more thoughtful about actions taken.

Police officers, I hope, will always use force when it’s required and necessary for their protection and for the public’s protection. But I think they’ll be more judicious and conscious about it if they know they have to fill out a detailed report, and someone’s going to be looking at that report to see if it met the policies and procedures set forth by the department.

RH: Yes, that would be very consistent with the work that we’ve seen in the research across the country. Where we can’t speak to whether measurement changes behavior, we can certainly speak to the fact that what you described earlier rings true with national research — which is this confluence of what you brought up about . . . I’m going to call it ‘broken windows theory’. If it’s the officers who are swearing who may also be more likely to be involved in using force earlier than called for, our research shows that if you are struggling in one area, you’re going to be struggling in multiple areas — it’s usually not isolated.

Being able to look at use of force patterns could be part of understanding how all factors work together. It makes tons of sense and congratulations. You guys [New Jersey] are, from our research of all 50 states, the first state to not only require but actually have it executed statewide. Benchmark is lucky to be part of the story and we’re happy to be able to serve where we can.

Don’t miss Part 2 in our post Our Work in Progress and Reflections on Policing in the Past, where Mr. Eicher discusses new polices his state is implementing to improve transparency and accountability, moving toward a more effective, evidence-based early intervention system — as well as sharing his thoughts on various policing reforms over time and the need to look at the criminal justice system as a whole.

This interview from October 2020 has been edited for clarity.

Understanding Agency Culture and its Impact on Reform

Posted on by Amy Vracar

The following is part 2 of 2 in our IACP Leadership Series conversation between Benchmark CEO Ron Huberman and Chuck Wexler, Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). In this entry, Mr. Wexler shares his thoughts on agency culture, reviewing use of force incidents captured on camera from other agencies to collaborate on generating new policies and procedures for desired outcomes . . . as well as the need to invest in the future of policing in meaningful ways rather than defunding the police.

RH: Chuck, I’d like to go a little bit deeper dive on culture…and for those of you who don’t know, Chuck publishes interviews six days a week (through PERF). I would say it’s pretty compelling…and for those who don’t subscribe to that email, I have found it super important as a way to hear the voices of other folks and what they’re struggling with…and I think your decades of experience helps in synthesizing that information.

You had a column that you published in your email, that you said to me got the most response — and I found it very compelling. It was about Monday morning quarterbacking. Can you give us a quick summary, Chuck, of what you advocated for and why it’s such a sea change from what’s occurring today in American policing?

Chuck: Well, the area that I find the most fascinating and has the most opportunity for change and reform is the one that’s least talked about — and that’s culture…the culture of an organization. I’ve gone into literally hundreds of police departments in the country, as you have Ron, and you walk into a department and you can feel what kind of culture it is. And there’s not just one culture in a police department, there’s the 11th District culture…there’s detective culture, and so on. The point is that culture, in so many ways, drives policy and action.

Like you, I think America has been exhausted from the videos that are seen, whether it’s in Kenosha, or it’s Rochester or George Floyd or it’s Ferguson…it’s exhausting. I began to think about this and I began to think about culture. You know, we teach ICAT, which is Integrated Communication Assessment Tactics, which is going to change policing. When we were in that class with people, we would show them videos because my folks view videos every single day. We’ve been doing this for five years on every officer-involved shooting. We have a Google search engine that’s picking them up, looking at them, analyzing them…and that’s how we develop our training. When you show these videos to a class of police, the first thing they do is they fold their arms, they cock their head about 45 degrees, and someone raises their hand and says, “You weren’t there. We shouldn’t be commenting on it.” We all look at him; we know it’s at that moment they’re in charge of the informal culture in that room.

You have to work through that issue with them. For people who are such tough guys, they can be very sensitive about criticism, and so forth. They want to protect each other — understood. However, today, what we know is with 18,000 police departments and all these videos, if you don’t take that video, and you don’t use that video in your own department and say, “What would happen if we had this situation?” You’re wasting an opportunity.

The idea is this terrible thing happened, like Rochester, for example. You look at that situation, and you say to yourself, “Okay, it’s three o’clock in the morning, we get this call, we have this naked person, we think he’s on PCP…how would we handle that in our city?” My point is that we need to be doing Monday morning quarterbacking and policing because that’s the way the field is going to change. It’s not going to change if we say we can’t talk about that because we weren’t there. That’s the old thinking.

The new thinking is, “This is a terrible thing that happened. How can we learn about that so that maybe a terrible thing won’t happen to our community? And it’s okay…maybe we don’t have the answers.” I’ve even said, take that video from Rochester, and go into a community and bring stakeholders together and show them the video and say, “What should we do in our community? Should the police own this or should a social service agency? Are they available at three o’clock in the morning? Would you like to come with us to that call?”

There’s a way to take these tragedies and use them in a way that’s helpful to your own community so that people get a sense, first of all, how your own department would perform. Sometimes you’ll find out it’s almost like how the NTSB does it with airplanes when they crash…they try to figure it out. This is different. This is much lower risk because you’re not doing your own department. I still believe in that. Chris Magnus in Tucson is doing a magnificent good job but this is a way in which every day you can be teaching your department and learning where you have gaps. “Would we do this? Do we have policy on this? No, we don’t. Oh, okay.” So, I think that’s how policing is going to change. That’s all culture. We have to write this policy. We have to train this way, but what happens in the real world, does that make sense?

RH: To me, it makes a ton of sense. The challenge to do that is you have to make it safe for people and it’s a hard thing to do. Chuck, you know them but a lot of people probably don’t — in my many jobs in life, I was the CEO of the Chicago Transit Authority. I had a few derailments while I was the CEO and the NTSB came out, and the train operator was in the room, the Union was in the room, I was in the room, the NTSB was in the room and it was designed in a way that was safe. We were all just trying to figure out what went wrong in the system so that we could ultimately fix it and make it less likely to happen in the future…and it was wildly effective because we would always end up with action items.

CW: It’s interesting because when you are doing it on your own, there are some risks involved. Let’s face it, it’s like, you can uncover, “Oh, my God, we didn’t do this,” but it is what it is because someone’s going to find out so it’s better to find out right away. What I’m talking about in some ways is very low risk because it happened in someone else’s jurisdiction. You’re trying to learn from it. It’s almost like a very low-risk, high-outcome kind of thing where you have the value of sitting around with your colleagues and say, “What if five officers respond to that?” You’ve seen that in Chicago, right? You can have five people respond and one of those officers somehow knows that the other four are doing something wrong, but he or she doesn’t know how to deal with it — “What do I say? What do I do? This doesn’t feel right”.

RH: I think one of the most befuddling, challenging things for folks to wrap their head around, is this idea of de-fund the police. I think that’s the case because no one really understands what it is. It’s more of a response or an outcry. Two questions, Chuck. One is, what do you think de-fund the police actually means? Why do you think this has become a thing in certain cities in the US?

CW: Well, it’s interesting. I’m just going to go back to Ferguson; if you look at that period, what did reform look like? Basically, it was about implicit bias training…and it was about body-worn cameras…it was about de-escalation. It was about those kinds of things…about training…it was about technology. Now with the George Floyd moment, I don’t think anyone expected that the response to this terrible incident would be how do we take resources away from the police department. It was counterintuitive. It almost felt like people were angry that we can’t fix the police, so let’s reduce the police. Let’s have other people do what the police should be doing.

We did a survey and we saw that about 48% of the police departments somehow have reduced their budget. Unfortunately, it had some impact. Now, I don’t know if that’s because of what’s happening with COVID-19, and the economy and taxes. I think some of that is there. I actually think what’s happening now is cooler heads are prevailing in most places, like in New Jersey and places where people say, “You know what, we need good police.”

The reality is, if you want to fix the police, it takes an investment. You have to invest in the police to fix the police. You look at Seattle. Seattle spent $100 million over five years to put in reforms. I think in terms of training, in terms of technology, in terms of technical assistance, those are relatively small pieces of a police department budget — 90% or 95% is personnel. If you have to cut a police department’s budget, you’re going to wind up either having to cut a class or not hire a class. Look, in New York, they went from $6 billion to $5 billion and in LA, they cut a quarter of a billion dollars. That’s huge…and you’re really impacting the future generations of that police department.

If you’re trying to change the culture, a big part of that is bringing new people in. I think that cooler heads are starting to prevail. It just seems to me counterintuitive if you’re trying to fix the police. Because if you’re trying to avoid that George Floyd situation or any of these situations, it means ultimately finding ways to get the police to respond differently. That requires attention, technology, training, hiring new people, and diversifying your workforce.

RH: Chuck, having run many large organizations like yourself, I can tell you, they only win when you invest in people in a meaningful way. When there is a death spiral of budget and cuts, the impact on morale is I think the exact opposite of what folks who are advocating for this would want to see happen. Rather than raising the standard, raising the expectation of conduct, investing in the training and the technology to achieve it, we’re seeing the opposite in some places.

CW: The only thing I have to measure this against was 2007 and 2008, when we had the great recession, and we did all sorts of reports on that period of time. It was really interesting because we run the Senior Management Institute for Police —you’ve been there, you know about it. What I found interesting was that departments, even though they had to cut back on hiring, they were sending people to SMIP. I remember talking to some people like Chuck Ramsey, and so forth, and I said, “You’re having to do this stuff.” And he said, “Well, you know what, we have to invest in the future.”

It was like you have to invest in people. I think those were the really great managers that recognized, I might have to cut here, but I want to make sure I’m sending my people. I want to make sure that we continue to move forward…even if we can’t hire new officers. I want to make sure I invest in my workforce.

RH: Chuck, we’re grateful for what you do. We’re grateful for the Police Executive Research Forum. For those folks who aren’t super familiar with it, it’s policeforum.org. I can tell you certainly as someone who has been involved or watching or participating in this profession for a long time, I’ve always found the work that you and your organization have done have helped lead the way throughout a lot of difficult times. Thank you very much. We appreciate it.

This interview has been edited for clarity.

Committing Your Agency to Honorable Police Practices

Posted on by Amy Vracar

The following is part 1 of 2 in our IACP Leadership Series conversation between Benchmark CEO Ron Huberman and Chuck Wexler, Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). In this entry, Mr. Wexler shares his thoughts on the role of policing in addressing and adjusting to COVID-19, as well as the importance of building the right team reflective of values committed to honorable police practices.

RH: Chuck, we’re very grateful for the work that you do in policing. Let me start with a very broad question: Can you tell us a little bit about the current chapter of police reform? I don’t think back in February anyone would have predicted the impact of COVID-19 and certainly, I don’t think people would have predicted that police reform would have shot to the very top of what is on the minds of Americans and politicians in cities. What do you make of it?

CW: Well, I think it’s hard to talk about police reform outside of the context of COVID-19. I just think that you’ve had this combustible mixture from March to the period we’re in now in October. I think that’s important because we’re at an incredible point in American history – actually in world history. We wrote a publication back in 2007 on the pandemic and I thought when we were writing it, “Well, this will never happen.” We talked about quarantines…we talked about social distancing…the delivery of vaccines…the role of the police…what if people don’t want to social distance…what if people don’t want a quarantine…how to manage the economy, and all of those things.

Again, we wrote that back in 2007, almost 14 years ago. Then this thing hits and the police have been in the middle, insofar as being that response unit to all things that have happened as a result of the pandemic and the role that they’ve played in terms of social distancing; how they themselves have had to change during the pandemic, in terms of staffing…in terms of delivery of services…in terms of outsourcing things. Some departments have been devastated. Now, the NYPD has had 46 members of the department who have died, thousands who’ve gotten infected…while there are other departments around the country who have hardly been infected.

Then we’re into the second wave now. One of the things – and you would appreciate this – that’s so good about policing is the ability to adapt to any kind of emergency situation. You take the Yonkers Police Department and the police commissioner there — he realized in one of his areas of the city that his officers were getting infected…so he put them in one-officer cars.

People would say, “Why is that so significant?” Well, you have union agreements. You would never be able to put officers in one-response unit cars in any normal service. Everybody understood, like in New York and then Detroit, officers were infecting each other. Then in terms of dispatch and response, like in Detroit, you had

a dispatcher who got sick and actually, I believe, died. They had to close down the dispatch center and open up another just like that.

Policing was just getting into that groove — it’s almost like having a hurricane or 9/11 or Boston bomber situation, which is like a one-day thing. But what happens when that one-day event happens day after day after day. You have 12-hour shifts. And you have police command that are separated, like Dermot Shea, the police commissioner of New York and his first deputy — they’re never in the same room…they’re in different places. And you have mayors and police chiefs both getting it.

RH: If COVID had not occurred, what would have been the fallout from the George Floyd event, and how would that have impacted American policing versus how it actually did?

Chuck: That’s a really good question because COVID had this impact that people really don’t understand yet. Historians are going to look back at this period and try to figure out what was going on. Because you have this dynamic in which people are staying at home quarantining themselves, and we saw some crimes get lower, while other crimes increased. When the George Floyd incident happened, it was horrible. I mean, it was just devastating.

It reminded me to some degree of the Rodney King incident in terms of the visceral image of someone being beaten, or in this case, who subsequently died. But I wonder what happened when the demonstrations occurred across the country — they were demonstrations unlike anything we’ve seen since the ’60s, both in terms of the number, the degree, and so forth — I wonder if, to what degree the pandemic had on people in terms of getting out of their house, finally being outside expressing themselves…because I’ve also seen an increase in shootings and murders across the country.

I’ve been asking people about that, what impact does the pandemic have on relationships in terms of drug dealing, gang activity, and so forth? Some of that is about things that were happening to people, and that small things might lead to larger things very quickly. Gun sales went way up. So, I don’t know. What do you think?

RH: Chuck, it’s hard to say because I think that before George Floyd, there was a cumulative fatigue occurring in the public around police incidents. It was cumulative, Chuck, in my opinion, not because there has been any fundamental shift in policing, but because video cameras are so ubiquitous in every part of society, that events that historically would not have been that visceral video image, now are. I think much like you, Chuck, I think it’s hard to opine on or know the impact of COVID on the public outcry. But I think it’s very safe to say that long before George Floyd, there was a cumulative exhaustion happening, because the images of all police – and it goes to 800,000 police officers in the United States – and one event, ultimately reflected on everyone, over and over again, which is a complicated dynamic.

CW: I think that’s a really good point. I think that – and you know this because you were involved in Chicago at the time when I thought you were crazy when you installed all these cameras in Chicago ­– I thought, “Oh, my God, that will never work”. But it had a dramatic impact on people, neighborhoods, rather than people wanting them taken away and people thinking, “Oh, my God, big brother, this is surveillance.” They had exactly the opposite reaction. They actually felt safer walking around. I know you were really responsible for implementing that.

It’s interesting because we wrote the guidelines of body-worn cameras for the Justice Department. I remember writing the introduction to that, and basically saying that this is going to change things in ways we don’t know. When all these departments started adopting body-worn cameras, say five or six years ago around the time of Ferguson — what people thought was going to happen with body-worn cameras didn’t really happen. They thought body-worn cameras would prevent these incidents from happening. What body-worn cameras have done is actually captured footage and scenes that the American people don’t usually see. And you had all of these other cameras out there from citizens. What hasn’t changed, quite frankly, is the body-worn cameras haven’t changed how you handle some of these situations, they just record them. Now they may have changed or impacted other things – how you treat people – but at the end of the day, unless you change training and policy and culture, all you’re doing is recording it. It’s just a small footnote of how technology can sometimes have an impact but doesn’t always have the impact you expect.

RH: Yes, isn’t that true, Chuck? Let me ask you this, because you just touched on training and policy and culture. Chuck, you wake up tomorrow and you’re no longer the executive director of PERF, but you are a police chief of a major city. You’re putting your game plan together to figure out what would be your pathway. And, I would argue too, Chuck – and I think you’d likely agree – that whether it’s Chicago or Baltimore or New York or LA or Philadelphia…all of the large cities and midsize cities alike are struggling with the same issues of what we like to say is, restoring the honor of the badge, building back public trust and faith in the police. What would be some of the things that would be on the top of your list for your city, as a chief, to think about or implement to begin down that road?

Chuck: It’s a series of things in no particular order. I’m a big proponent, as I know you are, of Good to Great by Jim Collins. He’s someone I have a lot of respect for and I’ve done a lot of work with him. I think part of it is building your own team, getting the right people on the bus…the right people in the right seats. That management team is really important, how that is reflective of your values. When I look at situations police departments get into, I look at how that command staff communicates with each other. If something happens at two o’clock in the morning that’s a bad issue, how long does it take for that police chief to know what actually happened? In really well-run organizations, that can be very quick. In today’s society, communication is so important. You see police chiefs who handle these incidents really well.

In essence, the first part of the answer is, I want to get a command staff that is reflective of my values, which should be their values. Do they have – honesty, transparency, community sensitivity, responsiveness – all of those things. What’s going to be my relationship with the community? How am I going to manage that? Then look at the internal organization — so key indicators. Where do we stand on a whole set of factors? Where do we stand in terms of policy, high-risk situations? How are we going to handle that? What kind of organization, what kind of feedback loop do we have? If we screw up, how are we going to handle screw-ups? We know how to handle success. How do we handle failure?

RH: Let me challenge you on how to handle failure. I’m going to ask you to tell a story, Chuck, that you shared with me that has resonated with me almost more than any other police chief story that I’ve heard. It’s the idea of what do we do when we screw up? I would say, my opinion Chuck, is American policing has gotten dramatically better. We release tape, we call on the family, we get in front of it. We meet with community, we apologize. By the way, those are just dramatic shifts from even a year ago — the idea that a chief prior to a full investigation would say anything other than we need to let the investigation occur, is lost on the public. To those of us who’ve been deeply involved in policing, it’s a massive shift.

The story that I want to ask you about, Chuck, is a story related to not what you do when you mess up, but rather how do you try to limit the mess-ups before they occur? How do you get in front of that deeply problematic use of force event that will always look terrible on TV? When you and I had this conversation a year ago at IACP, we were sitting there in Chicago, not knowing about COVID-19, when you told me a story about John Timoney in Miami and what he did. Do you mind sharing that story of Chief Timoney and the dramatic impact he had on Miami?

CW: John Timoney is one of my heroes…a renaissance man who was also a street cop and very worldly. Any kind of use of force insights I have I owe to him to the greater degree. He came to the United States as an Irish immigrant with his brother. Basically, he worked his way up through the NYPD. He was there in that Camelot period of time when Bill Bratton became police commissioner in the early ’90s. He had a meteoric rise…he was like a one-star and he was made a four-star…a legendary person in the NYPD because he had the big picture. He was very smart. He was very well-regarded by his peers.

Bratton saw this in him and promoted him. He was a major part of the Bratton team. I would say he was one of the three or four key people. So, he does that, and then he becomes Philadelphia Police Commissioner, where he made some major changes. Then he comes to Miami, where he was also president of PERF. He and I really knew each other for 20 years. He’s really good at diagnosing issues. The one thing he understood better than anyone was use of force.

So, Miami had a major Justice Department investigation…a memorandum of agreement or consent decree, basically, because Miami had been involved in a pattern of use of force cases. But he had these good people around him and he had to identify how to deal with use of force.

He did a series of things. He changed the use of force policies, he brought many of the lessons from New York — don’t shoot at cars, firearms discharge review. Then he recognized that a number of officers were involved in a series of use of force incidents. He actually looked at that himself, and he identified the officers that had been involved in these use of force situations. He basically took them off the street and put them in places where they couldn’t cause harm.

In some ways, it was like he had this intuitive early warning system in which basically, using his good judgment, he looked into these situations: “Wait a second, look at these guys. They’ve been involved in a series.” He identified them and took them off the street. Then something unusual happened. Miami went 21 months without an officer-involved shooting. It was remarkable. He used to pride himself on that; he’d say, “Chuck, got another month, another month.” Importantly, crime went down, use of force off the charts. He then went back to the Justice Department and said, “Look what we’ve done.” They sent him a letter saying, “You are now in compliance.” It was really an amazing story.

RH: Chuck, right before he came, there had been a large number of officer-involved shootings.

CW: There had been a series of them. He inherited a department that had a series of abuse instances and the Justice Department investigated and he comes into that and on his own, he does it. But here is the postscript to this story: This is like an experiment, a real experiment. So, then he leaves…another police chief comes in, let’s call him the “un-Timoney”. He comes in, he takes those officers, puts them back on the street, and the shootings start to go way up and the Justice Department comes back. True story.

RH: Chuck, this is what so deeply resonated with me when you and I were meeting and you shared that story with me. What resonated is that that is exactly what Benchmark as a research organization does and sees — is that you have a small group of officers who are repetitively using dramatically higher levels of force more often. And ultimately, the argument that I make over and over again whenever I get the audience of Chiefs, is that it’s a noble thing and that everyone can be Timoney, in my opinion. Because if you do nothing else, but in a non-punitive, non-disciplinary way, find a better fit for those officers where we know they have a pattern of force that gets used over and over again, is just an easy button, if you will, to try to get in front of what are incredibly complicated incidents.

Timoney is now my hero as well. I was lucky enough when I was a young police officer in the Chicago Police to have met him. He was a legend back then and hearing him talk about the profession and about force was super compelling.

Don’t miss Part 2 of this conversation, where Mr. Wexler discusses generating new policies and procedures for desired outcomes and the need to invest in the future of policing.

This interview has been edited for clarity.